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NOTES
recognize their responsibility to provide the means for willing residents
to protect their homes from blight, and the methods by which recalcitrant
property owners can be induced to forestall this process of gradual
deterioration.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND ATTEMPTS TO
AVOID "STATE ACTION"
The Iroquois Amphitheatre, built by the city of Louisville, Kentucky,
as part of its park system, was leased to the Louisville Park Theatrical
Association, a private organization, for the purpose of presenting theatri-
cal productions at a reasonable cost to the citizens of Louisville.' The city
reserved the right to make rules and regulations to assure good order-
among these was the policy of denying admission to Negroes. 2 The city
maintained the Amphitheatre in clean condition and received all profits
accruing from its operation.3 The lease also recited that the Theatrical
It now has about 100 "blocks" organized with 1,000 members paying dues of $5
per year and about 1,200 additional active participants and volunteers including Herbert
Thelen, professor of social science at the University of Chicago.
The conference was originally organized in an attempt to do something about
living conditions in the area including inadequate housing facilities, increases in crime,
overcrowded schools and inadequate playgrounds. It has expanded its operation to
include anything that is connected with living conditions and is a worthy opponent
of blight. It operates in a strictly democratic manner along the pattern of a town
meeting.
Mr. Chase gives five basic ideas upon which the conference operates:
"1. Blighted areas are a growing problem in many American cities, depressing
land values, threatening homeowners.
"2. Racial segregation in housing is not legal now that the U. S. Supreme Court
has decided that 'restrictive covenants' cannot be enforced. If integration is bound
to come, a way must be found whereby the races can live peaceably together.
"3. Urban blight and deterioration cannot be halted by reformers, no matter how
consecrated. If the problem is to be solved, the people themselves must do it, all the
people in the area, working together.
"4. The interest and energy of the people, however, are not enough. Facts must
be available instead of rumors, and special techniques are needed to cope with complex
conditions. This means some kind of central clearinghouse which can channel facts
and skills from experts to people. But the central office should produce tools only
when they are called for. Responsibility should remain with the people.
"5. No matter how well equipped to meet local problems the people may be, they
are at the mercy of larger forces: population movements, changing industrial patterns,
highway and traffic developments, federal and state legislation. Therefore, the people
must link themselves with a broader organization which has its eye continually on
these greater forces." Readers Digest, May, 1953, pp. 44-45.
1. Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525, 528 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
2. Id. at 528, 529.
3. "It was agreed that the Association would pay the City any profit realized
from the operation, less $5,000, which the Association originally contributed to the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Association was to have exclusive use of the Amphitheatre each year
from May 1 to September 30, any other use during that time to be
obtained through a sublease from the Association. 4 When the exclu-
sionary aspect of this arrangement was challenged as violative of the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, a federal district court
held that since the lease was for a temporary period and since Negro
organizations could lease the facilities during the times they were not
used by the lessee, the denial of admission to Negroes was a proper
exercise of the rights of the private association. 5 The fact that the city
promulgated this regulation was evidently ignored.6
The Louisville park situation is illustrative of at least one method
being attempted in order to maintain racial discrimination 7 without vio-
lating the stricture of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. 8 Basic to such attempts is the utilization of private organiza-
tions so that state action within the meaning of the equal protection clause
cannot readily be found. Although this device already enjoys considerable
popularity, its use is undoubtedly curtailed by the fact that it is often
cost of construction of the Amphitheatre, which amount the Association reserved the
right to repay to the individuals who had contributed that fund." Id. at 529.
4. From 1947 to 1951 the Louisville Park Theatrical Association had exclusive
use of the amphitheatre during the following months: 1947, July 1 to Aug. 10; 1948,
July 5 to Aug. 14; 1949, July 11 to Aug. 21; 1950, July 10 to Aug. 6; 1951, July
6 to Aug. 19. Id. at 528. The contract also provided: "With respect to the use of the
Amphitheatre by persons or organizations other than the Association . . . the City
would not lease the Amphitheatre to other persons or organizations between May 1
and September 30, any year for the purpose of permitting to be produced therein,
any entertainment for which an admission fee or charge was made or from which it
expected to derive a pecuniary profit, unless the person or organization seeking to
so use said Amphitheatre, first apply for a sub-lease from the Association." (emphasis
added) 1d. at 529.
5. Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), aff'd
sub nora. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
petition for cert., 22 U. S. L. WE 3009 (U.S. July 7, 1953). The court said, "..
where the city did not participate either directly or indirectly in the operation of the
private enterprise [Louisville Park Theatrical Association] was guilty of no unlawful
discrimination, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. .. ."
6. ". . . [P]laintiffs were denied admission . . . solely and only on the ground
that they are colored persons of African descent and of Negro blood, pursuant to
regulations of the Director of Parks and Recreation which regulations have been in
force continuously since May 29, 1928." Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp.
525, 528 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
7. Much has been written stressing the nonlegal aspects of discrimination in
the United States. E.g., FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES (1949) ; JOHNSON
PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION (1943); KONVITZ, CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
(1947); MYRDAL, AN AMER1CAN DILEMMA, vols. 1 and 2 (1944); REPPY, CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); STRAUS, Two-THimS OF A NATION (1952).
8. The benefits derived by racial minorities under judicial rulings on equal pro-
tection may be giving impetus to private organization discrimination. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1951, p. 19, col. 8, which reported that a 1951 United Press survey revealed
that "thousands of Negro families have moved into white residential neighborhoods"
as a result of recent Supreme Court decisions.
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unnecessary so long as the states can act under the separate but equal
doctrine." The realization that litigation now pending before the Su-
preme Court'0 may rule out separate but equal foreshadows possible
expansion of the private organization device" and highlights the perplex-
ing legal problem of determining what factors will constitute state action
violative of the 14th Amendment. Precedent indicates that the vaguely
understood and defined term "state action" may turn on many factors
which implicate in varying degrees the relationship of governmental units
with private organizations. Examination of these factors and of the situa-
tions from which they arise will give some insight as to the validity of
the use of a private organization to maintain racial discrimination.
Perhaps the major criticism of the cases considering the issue of
state action is not that they do not raise points which indicate govern-
mental relationship with the private organization, but that they do not
evaluate these factors or make explicit the basis of their decisions. In-
stances appear where a court has examined a lease of public property to
a private organization, coupled it with a showing of various other
elements connoting state action which perhaps exist only in a very minute
manner, and found that the discrimination violated the equal protection
clause. 2 The difficulty presented by such opinions is in discerning how
many of these factors must exist and which are the most persuasive
of state action.
For example, the court in Culver v. City of Warren'3 carelessly
intermingles in its discussion several possible legal bases for invalidating
9. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Mr. Sol Rabkin of the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
10. Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952); Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. S.C. 1952); Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); and Gebhart -.
Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952) have all been argued and have been restored to the
docket for reargument, 21 U. S. L. WxIc 3307 (U.S. June 9, 1953).
11. The Richmond News Leader in an editorial "Southern Schools III-If the
Worst Comes," on May 30, 1951, referred to those who advocate the termination of
segregation in the South's public schools as ". . . Northern 'liberals,' and others who
do not comprehend the deep-rooted personal desires and traditions of the vast majority
of the South's white residents." The following day the News Leader offered its
solution if the Court declares segregation to be unconstitutional in an editorial, "Southern
Schools IV-If the Best Comes," in these words: "If lawful means can be found to
circumvent an adverse ruling . . .these means should be reduced to writing for sub-
mission to the next General Assembly. If constitutional revision is desirable, appro-
priate amendments should be drafted. If permissive arrangements are thought desirable,
by which school buildings could be leased to private groups, these arrangements should
be worked out. The best legal minds in the General Assembly-indeed in the State
as a whole-should be brought to bear on the complex problems, without thought
of political rivalry or partisan advantage. (emphasis added)
12. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Culver v.
City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
13. 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948)
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the city's lease of a swimming pool to a private organization which
discriminated, but nowhere attempts to specify one as alone sufficient.
The court spoke of the municipality's duty to see that its property is
open to all citizens, of the court's inability under Shelley v. Kraemer14
. to enforce any contract or lease which would make discrimination pos-
sible, and of the private group as being in fact an agency of the city.
In Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,'5 the court admitted
the existence of a lease and state aid in several forms. However, be-
cause the city had obtained no control, the court held an art school
to be private, obviously placing greatest emphasis on the lack of
control, while completely failing to consider the effect of state aid
or the lease. Two other state courts' failed to make explicit whether
they based their results on the federal or state constitutions, or on case
law. One of these courts utilized a trust theory, holding that the state
was a trustee of public property with the duty of seeing that it is used
for the benefit of all, 17 while the other imposed the duty upon the state
without specifying the ground upon which it relied.'8  Neither court
required a showing of state aid or control; the mere lease of government
property to a private group was deemed sufficient.
A better understanding of the governmental relationship to unequal
treatment may be obtained through classification of factors which may
be persuasive of state action. Three common categories are: leasing of
property, supplying of aid, and the granting of some power or privilege
to private groups. Closely related to these basic elements which establish
a governmental relationship is the instance where, because of its size,
a private organization assumes functions either ordinarily performed
by the government or which affect the rights of a large number of
people.' 9 Very few situations arise where the factual elements of only
14. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
16. Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 107, 55 N.E.2d
173 (1944) ; Kern v. Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
17. Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 107, 55 N.E.2d
173 (1944).
18. Kern v. Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
19. The court said of a housing project in New York City: "The contract
embodied a plan for the rehabilitation of a substandard area comprising eighteen city
blocks in the borough of Manhattan by the erection of thirty-five apartment houses
capable of accommodating about twenty-five thousand people." Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 529, 87 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1949). These buildings contain
8,755 apartments in the heart of Manhattan and comprise almost 2,500,000 square feet
of land 750,000 square feet of which were once city streets. Note, 23 TEmp. L.Q. 209,
211 n.26 (1950). The city of Chickasaw, Alabama, a suburb of Mobile, owned by
the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, has residential buildings, a system of sewers, a
sewerage disposal plant, a business district, and a post office. It was probably not
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one category are present; in most cases factors in each classification
may appear and their submission to the court as separate considerations
will emphasize the governmental link to the activity.
Leasing of Property
An action by the Negro citizens of Warren, Ohio, to enforce their
rights to use the Warren Municipal Swimming Pool exemplifies one
such instance. 20 The pool was built at public expense with federal and
municipal funds; when opened, city authorities imposed no restric-
tions upon its use. After some white citizens began to patronize a
nearby pool at Niles, Ohio, causing a loss of business to the Warren
pool, it was leased to the Veterans' Swim Club. This organization,
formed for the purpose of operating the pool, paid only a small rental
while the city reserved the right to make all necessary repairs.21  The
club invited only persons of the Caucasian race to become members and
would not accept applications from Negro veterans nor permit them to
swim in the pool. In a similar situation in Montgomery, West Virginia,
22
the city retained all rights of inspection and compelled the private group
to use all profits for improvement of the property; these provisions
make more manifest the extent of state control. The lease of public land,
upon which an amusement park is operated in Atlanta, Georgia, to a
private committee composed in part of city officials 23 demonstrates even
more forcefully the amount of state participation than does the outright
lease; the membership of the committee patently identifies the city with
the exclusionary practices. In South Carolina, where preparations have
already been made to relinquish the public school system to private indi-
viduals should that be deemed necessary, 24 state connection with any dis-
distinguishable from any other small city in this country. Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501-503 (1946).
20. Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
21. Id. at 378, 83 N.E.2d at 85.
22. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
23. Davis v. City of Atlanta, Southeastern Fair Ass'n v. Davis, 84 Ga.App.
572, 66 S.E.2d 188 (1951).
24. On March 16, 1951, Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina said: "Should
the Supreme Court decide this case against our position, we will face a serious problem.
Of only one thing we can be certain. South Carolina will not now nor for some
years to come, mix white and colored children in our schools.
"If the court changes what is now the law of the land, we will, if it is possible.
live within the law, preserve the public school system, and at the same time maintain
segregation. If that is not possible, reluctantly, we will abandon the public school
system." (emphasis added)
This statement was reprinted in the editorial "Southern Schools III-If the
Worst Comes" in the Richmond News Leader, May 30, 1951. The General Assembly
and people of South Carolina have since repealed the section of their constitution
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crimination would be evidenced by the lease, the almost certain need of
the private schools for financial aid, and a natural tendency of the state
to continue to control the curriculum.
Governmental power to lease property to organizations which do not
make the facility available to all regardless of race, creed, or color 25
has been limited by recent decisions. The opinions indicated that some
courts do not believe that. the power to lease embraces the power to dis-
criminate ;20 such action will not remove the city's constitutionally imposed
obligation to assure to all citizens the equal protection of the law.27
Variance exists as to exactly how the responsibility will be imposed. It
may be said that the lease includes an "implied provision protecting such
constitutional rights,"28 that the property is leased only temporarily and
still belongs to the state and so its use may not be restricted on the basis
of color,29 that the state is a trustee of its property with the public as
beneficiary and, therefore, it holds for the benefit of all,30 or that the
state has the duty where the property is built at public expense to make
certain that it is available to every citizen.3 The latter standard appears
to be the most clearly stated and the easiest to apply although all impose
the same duty. Members of a minority group denied access to publicly
constructed swimming pools, amphitheatres, or schools leased to private
groups, may attack such ostracism by seeking to invalidate any provision
in the lease which might be used to allow such exclusion and to secure
judicial recognition of the constitutionally imposed duty of the state to
assure that all citizens can enjoy the use of public property.
The theory that temporarily leased property remains subject to the
constitutional requirement is opposed by the rationale that since the lease
is only temporary it is proper because those barred now will have the
which required public education for children six to twenty-one years old. S.C. CONST.
Art. XI, § 5 as amended by Ratification Act No. 24 of the Acts and Joint Resolutions
of 1951.
Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the Hon. James F. Byrnes,
Governor of the State of South Carolina.
25. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Lincoln Park
Traps v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 107, 55 N.E.2d 173 (1944); Kern v.
Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940) ; Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373,
83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
26. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); cf.
Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E. D. Tenn. 1953).
27. Id. at 1009.
28. Ibid.
29. Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
30. Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 107, 55 N.E.2d
173 (1944).
31. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Kern
v. Newton, 151 Kan. 565, 571, 100 P.2d 709, 713 (1940).
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opportunity to lease it later.32 The latter may be an appropriate, or at
least plausible, decision when a picnic area is leased for one or two
days, 33 but its application to the leasing of an amphitheatre for most
of the summer is highly questionable since only the winter months are
left for the excluded group.34 Refinements and distinctions of the word
"temporary" serve only to obscure rather than clarify the main issue:
the state's relationship to the exclusionary policy. Although in consider-
ing whether the lease is temporary or permanent a court at least tacitly
admits that permanent unequal use of the property would be unconsti-
tutional, the litigant's greatest difficulty is that the court may interpret
temporary in an almost all inclusive manner.35
Possibly the strongest legal attack upon an attempt by a govern-
mental unit to discriminate through the leasing device is proof that the
lessee organization is an agency of the state. Clearly a state agency will
not be permitted to discriminate. In the leasing situation, retention of
control by leasing to a committee of city officials, 36 reservation of rights
to inspect,3 7 and refusal to allow private profit,38 are measures which
have been employed to evidence an agency relationship.
Granting of Aid
The complexities involved in determining the issue of state action
are increased when state aid to a private organization represents the
only relationship. It seems clear that the mere receipt of public aid
does not transform an otherwise private function into state action.3 9
32. Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), aff'd
sub norm. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
33. See Harris v. City of St. Louis, 233 Mo. App. 911, 111 S.W.2d 995 (1937), dis-
tinguished by Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D. W. Va. 1948), which
said that where a city auditorium or picnic ground is made available for rent to
white and Negro groups for short periods of time there is no discrimination so long
as segregation is not discrimination.
34. See note 4 supra.
35. Opponents of governmental evasion of responsibility through the leasing
device may bolster their argument by showing the impracticability of contending
that a community could build water works, sewerage systems, roads or flood walls
under statutory authority and turn them over to private groups without providing
for equal use by all. This would be the equivalent of allowing a city to furnish
the ways and means for private discrimination. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp.
1004, 1009 (S.D. W. Va. 1948). In West Virginia the statute that conferred the power
for such projects is: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 510(2)-510(3) (1949). Similar statutes
have been passed in many states. E.g., CAL. GEN. LAWs AcT § 8010 (1945); Iki'
ANN. STAT. §48-5305 (Burns Repl. 1950); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAWS §20(2).
36. See note 23 supra.
37. See note 22 supra.
38. Ibid.
39. No cases were found which held that the mere acceptance of some state
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As is true with respect to a lease, the state may give aid to a private
group without any desire that its distribution be determined by the
recipient's race, creed, or color. 40  Many governmental units, offering
varying amounts and kinds of aid to private organizations, intend only
to accomplish some worthy public purpose and not to evade any constitu-
tional duty.41 Nevertheless, if the state by granting assistance achieves
a certain amount of control over a private group which pursues exclu-
sionary policies, the relationship between the two becomes more obvious
and may be utilized as the basis for legal attack.
A privately operated and controlled art school in Baltimore, Mary-
land, receiving state assistance through reduced rent and subsidization,
refused to permit attendance by Negroes. 42 In return for the subsidy,
city council members were permitted to grant scholarships to a limited
number of white students. Moreover, as the governmental aid exceeded
the value of the scholarships, 43 the state by subsidy made possible reduced
tuition costs.
In another Baltimore case the city contributed financially to the
Enoch Pratt Free Library, but Negroes were refused admission to its
training class for librarians. 44 The library though privately established,
now receives annual appropriations from the city and was expanded
with municipal funds into a large and modern library to meet the city's
needs. Since 1935 library employees have received their salaries directly
from the city, have utilized its retirement plan, and in addition the
library's budget requires approval by the city council; all are methods by
which the municipality may exercise control over the library.
In recent years government has either assumed the function of
building homes or attempted to further it by assisting in the construc-
tion of low cost public housing.45 A large part of the new Levittown
being erected near Morristown, Pennsylvania, in connection with the
establishment of the new U. S. Steel plant in that area, is being financed
aid made the activity public. Even those cases which extended the concept did not
so hold. See note 25 supra.
40. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
41. Ibid.
42. Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
43. Id. at 445. Tuition is at the most $190 a year per student and the state
scholarships are given to 100 white students, a total value of $19,000. The city appro-
priates $16,500 annually and rents a building to the school at a saving of $11,500
making a total $28,000 expended by the state. It can be argued that the granting of
the scholarships by the council is clearly state action and is discriminatory because
Negroes are ineligible to receive them.
44. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1945).
45. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 522, 87 N.E.2d 541, 543
(1949); SamArus, Two-TniRas OF A NATION 116, 210-211, 236 (1952).
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by federal government low interest loans.46 The builder, however, refuses
to sell or rent the homes he builds to Negroes so that the housing project
is being established with discrimination.47 Consequently, this action will
change the previous residential pattern in which the few Negroes residing
in the area were not segregated.48 The denial of medical treatment to
Negroes by hospitals receiving state aid49 and the denial of admission
to the classes or auditorium of a large university which accepts state
grants"0 are other examples of the varied methods by which govern-
mental units in this country are able indirectly to extend aid solely to
members of the Caucasian race.
Aid which practically supports a private enterprise 51 opens the way
for the agency theory to again be employed as a basis for an assault
upon discriminatory practices. This should obviously follow since the
ability to withhold the aid enables the state to end the project at will.
If the function performed is ordinarily public, in addition to the receipt
of a large amount of state aid, authority exists for enjoining the dis-
criminatory practices.52 State assistance in exchange for certain controls
over the private group appears to be analogous to retention of control
through a lease and, therefore, should subject the activity to the same
constitutional restraints.8 3
46. Communication to the INDIANA LAW Jou NAL from Mr. Sol Rabkin of the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Negro patients are not admitted to the Cleveland, Mississippi, hospital although
public funds are used to support it in part. Negro patients there receive only first
aid regardless of their needs and those desiring more must go to larger cities where
segregated facilities are provided for them in publicly supported institutions. A Negro
seriously injured in an accident in the South may even be refused emergency treat-
ment. Such a refusal in Dalton, Georgia, resulted in the untimely death of Miss Juliette
Derricotte, an internationally known educational and social leader. JoHNsoN, PATrTErzs
OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 51 (1943). Christopher, The Need for a Civil Rights Act in
the District of Columbia, 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 582, 584 (1946). FPazrR, THE NEGRO
IN THE UNITED STATEs 546 (1949).
50. Representative Arthur Klein informed the House of Representatives that
George Washington University has received federal funds with some of the appro-
priations specifically prohibiting discrimination in their use and yet the university
continues its discriminatory practices against Negroes. No Negroes attend George
Washington and its famed Lisner Auditorium constructed with a grant by Abram
Lisner, which specifically prohibited discrimination in its use and ordered that the
Bill of Rights be inscribed on its walls, does not permit Negroes to enter. 96 CoNG.
REc. A 1321, A 1330 (1950).
51. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F.2d 212 (4th
Cir. 1945).
52. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
53. Less obvious means of providing aid are enforcement of contracts of a private
group (which is also a grant of power) or even by granting a corporate charter which
gives the corporation legal benefits it could not otherwise have.
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When the aid granted is insufficient to permit use of the agency
argument, a court may refuse to enjoin the unequal treatment of citizens
on the grounds that it is entirely private and the Fourteenth Amendment
"erects no shield against merely private conduct however discriminatory
or wrongful." 54 Thus a district court, while conceding that a private
school was receiving financial aid directly and in the form of a reduced
rental and was using property leased from the city, held that the institu-
tion could refuse to do anything about the discrimination. 55 If this
activity, and therefore the discrimination, can be considered private,
then certainly a university or hospital receiving only small amounts of
government assistance could also be considered private for purposes of
the equal protection clause proscription.
While a state cannot condition the use of its educational, recrea-
tional, or medical facilities on one's race, creed, or color56 it can be
maintained that through the various forms. of aid the state has accom-
plished indirectly what cannot be done directly. Thus the states have
assisted in providing medical care, education, and recreation for white,
but not for Negro citizens. Although perhaps insufficient to treat the pri-
vate group as a state agency, the fact remains that the aid is state action.
the benefits of which some citizens are denied solely because they are
not members of the Caucasian race. Since, as the Supreme Court has
proclaimed, the Constitution would be worth little if its mandates could
be indirectly violated,57 the way is opened for future challenges aimed
not at eliminating the discrimination, but at halting the state aid. Pro-
hibiting public assistance will apply pressure on the private organization
to cease the discrimination in order to receive aid again. Relying upon
the premise that the state cannot indirectly accomplish what it cannot do
directly, the injured party's remedy would be to enjoin the agency or
agent representing the state from continuing the assistance to the private
group.58 The aid being furnished was made possible through taxes
collected from all citizens within the jurisdiction of the governmental
unit and the right to enjoy the benefits of the expenditure of them should
54. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), is a recent affirmance of this
doctrine which was set out by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
55. Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md.
1948).
56. "Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of
primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil
and political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on
the part of the States based on considerations of race or color." Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948).
57. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1948).
58. 15 U. OF Cii. L. REv. 745, 754 (1948).
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not be dependent upon one's race, creed, or color. An advocate of such
argument bears the burden of impressing upon the court the fact that
the state in making the disbursement has the duty to see that there is
no discrimination in its use.
Grant of Power
Receipt by a private organization of a governmental grant of power
or privilege is also in a sense a form of aid to the recipient. Nevertheless,
separate categorization is justifiable because it lends emphasis to the
difference between outright financial assistance, especially when it is only
a small percentage of the total income, and what might be termed an
actual delegation of governmental power. In the former case difficulty
is encountered in connecting the state to the activity, while in the latter
situation the use of state power is more apparent. A union enabled by
statute to become the sole bargaining agent for a company's employees
is thus permitted to attain far more power than would otherwise be
possible. Though the record of unions in this area is for the most part
good,59 some have excluded certain races from membership, a practice
which often prevents the employment of those individuals."0 A further
example of this category of state action is the Stuyvesant Corporation
in New York City61 which accepted certain powers and benefits from
the state02 in order to facilitate the construction of a housing project
from which Negroes were barred.6 3
Although authority and power granted by a state to private organi-
zations have brought their actions within the 14th Amendment prohibi-
tion,04 difficulty arises in ascertaining the amount of power the state must
grant before this contention may be advanced successfully. New York
City conferred upon the Stuyvesant Corporation the power of eminent
domain and also granted permission to arrange the streets within the
housing area, 5 yet the New York Court of Appeals chose to label the ex-
59. Northrup, Unions and Negro Employment, 244 AxNA. s 43, 44 (1946).
60. Ibid.
61. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 229 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
62. Id. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551.
63. Id. at 520, 87 N.E.2d at 542. The New York City Council prohibited dis-
crimination in private housing projects which receive financial aid from the city by
passing the Brown-Isaacs Bill. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1951, p. 1, col. 6 and
March 15, 1951, p. 6, col. 4. The New York Legislature in 1950 passed a law which
guarantees equal rights to all in publicly aided housing projects. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW § 18-a.
64. Steele v. L. & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan.
459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
65. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 520, 87 N.KE2d 541, 542
(1949).
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clusion of Negroes private action.66 When the government delegates
powers, which otherwise it alone exercises, to a private organization, that
group acquires some of the functions of government. To effectively pre-
vent the delegation of powers to be used as a means of circumventing the
Constitution requires that the ban against treatment be applicable to every
exercise of governmental powers. When an individual acting under color
of state law discriminates against another, the action can be enjoined even
though it was not specifically authorized by state law.6 7 In this situation
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is applied to the power
however used; the inquiry does not proceed to the question of whether the
power was being rightfully used. Similarly, delegations of powers should
be exercised in accordance with the 14th and 15th Amendments. 6s
The agency doctrine may be successfully invoked if the power
granted by the state is necessary for the private group to act or if it can
be proved that the private group is under the state's complete control.69
Performance of a Public Function
A private group exercising a governmentally conferred power
closely resembles a group which merely because of its size or function
66. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
This opinion received a vigorous and well written dissent, id. at 536, 87 N.E2d
at 552 written by Fuld J., Loughran C.J. and Desmoud J. of N.Y. Court of Appeals.
It has also been the target of sharp criticism. E.g., Notes, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 209 (1950) ;
11 Omo ST. L.J. 97 (1950); 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 146 (1949); 98 U. of PA. L. REv.
247 (1949) ; contra 28 TEXAs L. REv. 976 (1950) ; 34 VA. L. REv. 345 (1948).
67. The guarantees and prohibitions apply to the states and all who are the
repositories of state power. Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288 (1912). Closely connected with these cases is the situation
where a state official's discriminatory acts are accomplished by virtue of some authority
conferred upon him by the state and are thereby declared unconstitutional. "Misuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."
United States v. Classic, 315 U.S. 299, 326 (1940). For other excellent discussions
of "color of state law" see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944) ; Valle v.
Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949). In Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 906
(4th Cir. 1943), the court said: ". . . [T]he action of a duly qualified officer, acting
within the scope of his authority, constitutes State action, even though the particular
acts complained of may not be authorized." See also, Notes, 61 HARv. L. REv. 344,
348 (1948); 15 U. OF CH. L. Rxv. 745, 750 (1948).
68. "The vital requirement is State responsibility-that somewhere, somehow, to
some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power.
." See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (concurring opinion).
69. "For'the representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legisla-
ture which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict,
destroy, or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which
is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights. Steele
v. L. & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). See also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73,
88, 89 (1931); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F.2d 212
(4th Cir. 1945).
NOTES
is able t(, hinder the same rights as a government not restrained by an
equal protection clause. Extension of the concept of state action to
include judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants 70 has resulted in
the formation of land companies or clubs which must approve prospective
purchasers of property within a residential area.71 These innovations
are adopted ostensibly to protect the cultural standards of the neighbor-
hood,7 2 but in reality they provide a method for the private zoning of a
community. One such scheme is effected by a corporation's purchase
of a large area which is leased only to individuals with proper qualifica-
tions. Another places title in the individual but requires that the sale
of the property be with the consent of the board of directors of a non-
profit corporation. 73 A third device is now in operation in the Shaker
Heights residential section of Cleveland, Ohio; the plan concerns only
the occupancy or use of the property, thereby avoiding laws prohibiting
restraints on alienation. 74 Anyone purchasing property within the area
must be granted an occupancy or membership permit by the "permit
committee" of a nonprofit organization. A person buying without such
a permit confronts an ejectment suit or injunction and his grantor is
subject to a suit for damages. A requirement that a bond be furnished, to
be forfeited if the agreement is broken, makes enforcement more
effective.75 All of these include but a tacit agreement to exclude Negroes,
since the deeds contain only nonracial standards upon which to judge
applicants.76
Ample authority exists for the proposition that individuals and
groups performing duties of great public interest which are not of mere
private concern may be held subject to the restraint of the Constitution.
"The more an owner, for his own advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."'77
Further, a relationship "too close in origin and purpose to functions"
of government may make impossible the denial of service without good
cause ;71 when an organization "takes on ... attributes of government,"
constitutional safeguards are drawn into play.
79
70. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
71. Note, 37 CAmF. L. REv. 493 (1949).
72. Id. at 494.
73. Id. at 494 n.10.
74. Id. at 495 n.l1.
75. Id. at 495 n.13.
76. Id. at 497.
77. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
78. Nash v. Air Terminal Service, 85 F. Supp. 545, 549 (MD. Va. 1949).
79. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953). The Court in this case was
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The land company which assumes the task of zoning a large area
of the community receives little or no actual power from the city since
its formation and continued existence are dependent upon the members.
If a Negro, after being judged of insufficient "culture," buys and occupies
property without obtaining the permit he has covenanted to receive, his
defense based on the Shelley cases' to a suit for ejectment will encounter
difficulty in proving that race, creed, or color was the basis of the deci-
sion to withhold the permit."' Unless this can be accomplished, the court
will enjoin occupancy or grant some other remedy against the prospective
purchaser or his grantor ;S2 if proof of discrimination can be shown,
Shelley v. Kraemers is authority for refusing to enjoin. Success of
future legal proceedings against these corporations or clubs will depend
upon judicial willingness to recognize the absence of one race in an area
over a long period of time as evidence of discrimination and to recognize
that the function being performed, zoning, is ordinarily done by a munici-
pality. This latter approach corresponds to that used to prevent Negro
exclusion from Democratic primaries8 4 in the South and impairment of
constitutional rights by a privately owned town.8 5 In the hospital and
school situations similar appreciation by the judiciary that a vital public
task is being privately performed will be necessary before any great
advances can be made, unless of course, one or more of the three relation-
ships is also present. In such cases the combination of public function
and a lease, aid, or grant of power would seem to be a compelling
reason for finding the existence of state action.
Conclusion
Reexamination of the doctrine of private and state action reveals
that the distinctions have been used not to further the purposes of the
14th and 15th Amendments, but to render them helpless. The court
should not determine whether an activity is public or private by any
abstract technical rules of law based on whether the private group is
a representative of the state in principal and agent sense 8 or dedicated
referring to the Jaybird Party which had assumed the responsibility of choosing can-
didates for the Democratic primary.
80. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
81. Note, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 493, 496-497 (1949).
82. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 627, 628-629 (1949);
for a collection of cases discussing enforcement of restrictive covenants where no
racial issue is involved see 89 A.L.R. 812 (1934).
83. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
84. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
85. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
86. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932).
NOTES
to a public purpose as elucidated by a state court relying upon the com-
mon law.8 7 It is essential to determine as a factual matter the degree
to which an owner for his own advantage makes his property available
for use by the general public or to ascertain the actual relationship of
the activity to the state; the greater the degree or relationship the more
necessary it becomes to apply constitutional restraints. Clearly at least
three types of factual connection exist which may be used to show a
relationship between government and discrimihation. When facing a
situation of private exclusionary practices which is in some way related
to the state, the possibility of the existence of each of these should be
thoroughly explored.
Every governmental action in the United States in order to comply
with the Constitution must not discriminate, and this mandate should
be applied with equal care to every state movement large or small, direct
or indirect.88
87. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 510 (1946).
88. Mr. Bill Downs on the program "Edward R. Murrow with the News," C.B.S.
Radio Network, Friday, December 26, 1952, 7:45-8:00 P.M., E.S.T., expressed the
following hope: ". . . [O]ne by one the men soaked off the black from their faces
and hands. The towels revealed that two of those soldiers were Negroes, seven were
white, two of the men were brown, one being from Puerto Rico, the other from
Guam and the remaining two were yellow, South Koreans. There was no conscious-
ness in that bunker that one man was a different color from the other. It wasn't
the camouflage soot that made them the same either. It was something deeper, stem-
ming from the fact that a patrol depends upon the cooperation of each individual
member of it for its survival. ...
"It struck me that the cauldron that is the war in Korea also is a melting pot,just as diplomatically, the United Nations is a melting pot, and before the U. N.,
the United States was and is a melting pot . . . [PJerhaps the greatest good that will
emerge from this Far Eastern crisis is an awareness that freedoin-loving men of all
races and nations will have proved that they can and must work and fight together
if their freedom is to survive." (emphasis added)
